Cross-Debarment: A Stakeholder Analysis

Christopher R. Yukins

George Washington University - Law School


George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 45, 2013
GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-112
GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2013-112

As more nations and organizations establish debarment (or "blacklisting") systems, to exclude corrupt or incompetent firms and individuals from contracting, a serious question has arisen: if a contractor is debarred, should other jurisdictions automatically exclude that contractor in a "cross-debarment"? This paper, which grew out of an October 2012 symposium at the World Bank, discusses the advantages and disadvantages of cross-debarment, from the standpoint of various stakeholders. The article concludes that some stakeholders (such as debarring officials themselves) might prefer that there be no automatic cross-debarment, so that government officials retain discretion -- and so leverage -- to persuade contractors to take remedial measures. The paper concludes that while automatic cross-debarment might enhance anti-corruption efforts, automatic cross-debarment is likely to raise real -- and, in most cases, legitimate -- concerns in the affected stakeholder communities. Stakeholders would more likely coalesce around a more moderate approach, which ensured that debarments were fully publicized, and that officials in other nations had due notice of corruption and performance failure, but which left those officials with flexibility and discretion in addressing a foreign debarment.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 17

JEL Classification: D73, H57, K42

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Date posted: August 26, 2013  

Suggested Citation

Yukins, Christopher R., Cross-Debarment: A Stakeholder Analysis (2013). George Washington International Law Review, Vol. 45, 2013; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2013-112; GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2013-112. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2316252

Contact Information

Christopher R. Yukins (Contact Author)
George Washington University - Law School ( email )
2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States
202-994-9992 (Phone)

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