Market Power in Radio Markets: An Empirical Analysis of Local and National Concentration

28 Pages Posted: 8 Aug 2000 Last revised: 13 Sep 2010

See all articles by Robert B. Ekelund

Robert B. Ekelund

Auburn University - Department of Economics

George S. Ford

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies

Thomas Koutsky

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Date Written: September 10, 2010

Abstract

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 contains provisions that allow increasing levels of concentration in local radio markets. Debate has focused on whether allowing greater concentration of broadcast media resources into fewer hands is a sound public policy. One fear of regulators is the effect of increased concentration on the market power of radio stations. Concentrating on intraindustry variations, this paper systematically assesses the link between radio station profitability and market concentration. The underlying assumption of the empirical analysis is that sale price (or present value) of the radio station includes the present value of future profits. The results do not support a strong relationship between increases in concentration and the profitability of radio stations, although we find group ownership to increase efficiency.

JEL Classification: L51, L96

Suggested Citation

Ekelund, Robert B. and Ford, George S. and Koutsky, Thomas M., Market Power in Radio Markets: An Empirical Analysis of Local and National Concentration (September 10, 2010). Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 43, No. 1, April 2000, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=231751

Robert B. Ekelund (Contact Author)

Auburn University - Department of Economics ( email )

415 W. Magnolia
Auburn, AL 36849-5242
United States
334-844-2929 (Phone)

George S. Ford

Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies ( email )

5335 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 440
Washington, DC 20015
United States

Thomas M. Koutsky

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) ( email )

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20577
United States

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