47 Pages Posted: 30 Aug 2013 Last revised: 25 Dec 2014
Date Written: August 28, 2013
The claim that lawyers act as gatekeepers or certifiers in financial transactions is widely discussed in the legal literature. There has, however, been little empirical examination of the claim. We test the hypothesis that law firms have replaced investment banks as the gatekeepers of the market for sovereign debt. Our results suggest that hiring outside law firms sends a negative signal to the market regarding the pending issuance; a finding that is inconsistent with the thesis that outside law firms primarily play a certification role in the sovereign debt market.
Keywords: Lawyers, Gatekeepers, Reputational Intermediaries, Sovereign Debt
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bradley, Michael and De Lira Salvatierra, Irving Arturo and Gulati, G. Mitu, Lawyers: Gatekeepers of the Sovereign Debt Market? (August 28, 2013). International Review of Law and Economics, Forthcoming; Economic Research Initiatives at Duke (ERID) Working Paper No. 162. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2317633