A Theory of Strategic Voting with Non-Instrumental Motives

Li, C., Pique, R. A theory of strategic voting with non-instrumental motives. Soc Choice Welf (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01250-6

38 Pages Posted: 31 Aug 2013 Last revised: 28 May 2020

See all articles by Christopher Li

Christopher Li

Vanderbilt University

Ricardo Pique

Ryerson University, Faculty of Arts - Department of Economics

Date Written: February 24, 2020

Abstract

Empirical studies have documented non-instrumental motives for voting. However, the theoretical literature on strategic voting has largely ignored these motives. In this paper, we examine voter behavior in multi-candidate elections in the presence of ethical, expressive, and instrumental concerns. Voters in our model derive utility from both the election outcome and the action of voting. A fraction of voters are ethical, who follow a group-welfare maximizing voting rule. The rule may require them to misalign their votes, that is, to vote for a candidate who is not their most preferred. We characterize the optimal rule for the ethical voters and provide comparative statics with respect to various electoral parameters. In particular, we find that the degree of misaligned voting is increasing in the importance of the election but it is non-monotonic in the popularity of the Condorcet loser.

Keywords: Strategic Voting, Ethical Voters, Large Elections

JEL Classification: D72

Suggested Citation

Li, Christopher and Pique Cebrecos, Ricardo Santiago, A Theory of Strategic Voting with Non-Instrumental Motives (February 24, 2020). Li, C., Pique, R. A theory of strategic voting with non-instrumental motives. Soc Choice Welf (2020). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01250-6 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2318096 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2318096

Christopher Li

Vanderbilt University ( email )

Nashville, TN 37235
United States

HOME PAGE: http://christopherli.net

Ricardo Santiago Pique Cebrecos (Contact Author)

Ryerson University, Faculty of Arts - Department of Economics ( email )

Canada

HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/piquericardo/

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