More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature

37 Pages Posted: 4 Sep 2013

See all articles by Werner Güth

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Luiss Guido Carli University

Martin G. Kocher

University of Vienna

Date Written: August 30, 2013

Abstract

Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively-colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss important extensions of the standard ultimatum bargaining game in a unified framework, and, third, we offer a survey of the experimental ultimatum bargaining literature containing papers published since the turn of the century. The paper argues that the ultimatum game is an extremely versatile tool for research in bargaining and on social preferences. Finally, we provide examples for open research questions and directions for future studies.

Keywords: ultimatum bargaining, experiment, social preferences

JEL Classification: C910

Suggested Citation

Güth, Werner and Kocher, Martin G., More than Thirty Years of Ultimatum Bargaining Experiments: Motives, Variations, and a Survey of the Recent Literature (August 30, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4380, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2319871 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2319871

Werner Güth

Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Martin G. Kocher (Contact Author)

University of Vienna ( email )

Bruenner Strasse 72
Vienna, Vienna 1090
Austria

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