Family Firms and R&D Behavior - New Evidence from a Large-Scale Survey

Posted: 26 Sep 2013

See all articles by Thomas Schmid

Thomas Schmid

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics

Ann‐Kristin Achleitner

Technische Universität München - Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies

Markus Ampenberger

Technische Universität München - Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies

Christoph Kaserer

Technische Universität München (TUM)

Date Written: September 1, 2013

Abstract

This paper analyzes how founders and their families influence R&D intensity. Information on R&D comes from a large-scale, bi-annual survey among listed German firms. We find that R&D intensity is higher in firms that are actively managed by the family. The impact of family control (via voting rights) is negative, but mostly not significant. While this negative family control effect is in line with hitherto existing literature, the positive impact of family management is surprising. Indeed, this positive effect disappears if we follow previous research and use R&D information from financial statements. We show that this puzzling result is related to corporate opacity. Opaque family managed firms report too conservative R&D expenditures, especially if they face financial constraints. This leads to an under-estimation of R&D intensity in these firms if accounting figures are used.

Keywords: family firms, family control & management, R&D intensity, opacity

JEL Classification: O30, G30

Suggested Citation

Schmid, Thomas and Achleitner, Ann-Kristin and Ampenberger, Markus and Kaserer, Christoph, Family Firms and R&D Behavior - New Evidence from a Large-Scale Survey (September 1, 2013). Research Policy, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2322786

Thomas Schmid (Contact Author)

The University of Hong Kong - Faculty of Business and Economics ( email )

Pokfulam Road
Hong Kong
China

Ann-Kristin Achleitner

Technische Universität München - Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies ( email )

Arcisstr. 21
Munich, D-80290
Germany
+49 89 289 25181 (Phone)

Markus Ampenberger

Technische Universität München - Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies ( email )

Arcisstraße 21
München, 80333
Germany
++49 89 289 25483 (Phone)
++49 89 289 25488 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cefs.de

Christoph Kaserer

Technische Universität München (TUM) ( email )

Arcisstr. 21
Munich, D-80290
Germany
+49 89 289 25489 (Phone)
+49 89 289 25488 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cefs.de

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
425
PlumX Metrics