CEO Succession and Proprietary Directors: Evidence from Spanish Listed Firms

24 Pages Posted: 24 Nov 2013

See all articles by Guido Stein

Guido Stein

University of Navarra - IESE Business School

Manuel Gallego

University of Navarra - IESE Business School

Marta Cuadrado

University of Navarra, IESE Business School

Date Written: September 11, 2013

Abstract

La versión española de este artículo se puede encontrar en: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2324055

This study advances research on CEO succession and board monitoring of senior executives by examining how proprietary directors can affect the probability of CEO dismissal. Drawing on our newly developed database covering all CEO successions occurring in all Spanish listed firms during the period 2007-2010, we propose that proprietary directors may increase the board’s monitoring efforts over the chief executive, forcing him to resign in situations of poor performance. Hypotheses are tested longitudinally, using CEO succession data taken from 111 publicly-traded firms in the Spanish ‘mercado continuo’ over a four-year period.

Keywords: proprietary director, board of directors, ROA, corporate governance

Suggested Citation

Stein, Guido and Gallego, Manuel and Cuadrado, Marta, CEO Succession and Proprietary Directors: Evidence from Spanish Listed Firms (September 11, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2324052 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2324052

Guido Stein (Contact Author)

University of Navarra - IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Manuel Gallego

University of Navarra - IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

Marta Cuadrado

University of Navarra, IESE Business School ( email )

Avenida Pearson 21
Barcelona, 08034
Spain

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