Why Do People Non-Demand Reveal in Hypothetical Double Referenda for Public Goods?

Posted: 12 Sep 2013 Last revised: 4 Nov 2013

See all articles by Anthony Burton

Anthony Burton

Government of New Zealand - Treasury

Katherine Silz Carson

US Air Force Academy

Susan M. Chilton

University of Newcastle - Economics

W. George Hutchinson

Queen's University Belfast

Date Written: January 18, 2008

Abstract

Hypothetical contingent valuation surveys used to elicit values for environmental and other public goods often employ variants of the referendum mechanism due to the cognitive simplicity and familiarity of respondents with this voting format. One variant, the double referendum mechanism, requires respondents to state twice how they would vote for a given policy proposal given their cost of the good. Data from these surveys often exhibit anomalies inconsistent with standard economic models of consumer preferences. There are a number of published explanations for these anomalies, mostly focusing on problems with the second vote. This article investigates which aspects of the hypothetical task affect the degree of nondemand revelation and takes an individual-based approach to identifying people most likely to non-demand reveal. A clear profile emerges from our model of a person who faces a negative surplus i.e. a net loss in the second vote and invokes non self-interested, non financial motivations during the decision process.

Keywords: Demand revelation, Hypothetical referenda, Experimental economics

JEL Classification: C91, Q51

Suggested Citation

Burton, Anthony and Carson, Katherine Silz and Chilton, Susan M. and Hutchinson, W. George, Why Do People Non-Demand Reveal in Hypothetical Double Referenda for Public Goods? (January 18, 2008). Applied Economics, Vol. 41, No. 27, 2009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2324352

Anthony Burton

Government of New Zealand - Treasury

No. 1, The Terrace
Wellington, 6011
New Zealand

Katherine Silz Carson (Contact Author)

US Air Force Academy ( email )

HQ USAFA/DFEG
2354 Fairchild Drive, Suite 6K110
USAF Academy, CO 80840-6299
United States

Susan M. Chilton

University of Newcastle - Economics ( email )

Newcastle-upon-Tyne NE1 7RU
United Kingdom

W. George Hutchinson

Queen's University Belfast ( email )

David Leir Building
Belfast, BT9 5AG
Ireland

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