Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning in Restarting, Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games

47 Pages Posted: 13 Sep 2013 Last revised: 15 Sep 2013

See all articles by Kenju Kamei

Kenju Kamei

Durham University - Department of Economics and Finance

Louis Putterman

Brown University - Department of Economics

Date Written: September 11, 2013

Abstract

Previous research has shown that opportunities for two-sided partner choice in finitely repeated social dilemma games can promote cooperation through a combination of sorting and opportunistic signaling, with late period defections by selfish players causing an end-game decline. How such experience would affect play of subsequent finitely-repeated games remains unclear. In each of six treatments that vary the cooperation premium and the informational basis for reputation formation, we let sets of subjects play sequences of finitely-repeated voluntary contribution games to study the competing forces of (a) learning about the benefits of reputation, and (b) learning about backward unraveling. We find, inter alia, that with a high cooperation premium and good information, investment in reputation grows across sets of finitely-repeated games.

Keywords: cooperation, reputation, voluntary contribution, public goods, sorting, endogenous grouping, group formation, experiment

JEL Classification: C92, D74, D83, H41

Suggested Citation

Kamei, Kenju and Putterman, Louis G., Play it Again: Partner Choice, Reputation Building and Learning in Restarting, Finitely-Repeated Dilemma Games (September 11, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2324398 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2324398

Kenju Kamei (Contact Author)

Durham University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Durham, DH1 3HY
United Kingdom

Louis G. Putterman

Brown University - Department of Economics ( email )

Box B
Providence, RI 02912
United States
401-863-3837 (Phone)
401-863-1970 (Fax)

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