Do Managers Do Good with Other People's Money?

42 Pages Posted: 14 Sep 2013 Last revised: 24 Jul 2023

See all articles by Ing-Haw Cheng

Ing-Haw Cheng

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Harrison G. Hong

Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Kelly Shue

Yale School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: September 2013

Abstract

We find support for two key predictions of an agency theory of unproductive corporate social responsibility. First, increasing managerial ownership decreases measures of firm goodness. We use the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut to increase after-tax insider ownership. Firms with moderate levels of insider ownership cut goodness by more than firms with low levels (where the tax cut has no effect) and high levels (where agency is less of an issue). Second, increasing monitoring reduces corporate goodness. A regression discontinuity design of close votes around the 50% cut-off finds that passage of shareholder governance proposals leads to slower growth in goodness.

Suggested Citation

Cheng, Ing-Haw and Hong, Harrison G. and Shue, Kelly, Do Managers Do Good with Other People's Money? (September 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19432, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2325805

Ing-Haw Cheng (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada

HOME PAGE: http://inghawcheng.github.io

Harrison G. Hong

Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )

420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Kelly Shue

Yale School of Management ( email )

135 Prospect Street
P.O. Box 208200
New Haven, CT 06520-8200
United States

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
90
Abstract Views
5,071
Rank
527,182
PlumX Metrics