The Case Against a U.S.-Arms Monopoly

15 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2013 Last revised: 14 Nov 2013

See all articles by Christopher J. Coyne

Christopher J. Coyne

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Abigail R Hall

University of Tampa

Date Written: September 15, 2013

Abstract

The U.S. government is the dominant player in the global arms market. An existing literature emphasizes the many benefits of an international U.S.-government arms monopoly including: regional and global balance, stability and security, the advancement of U.S. national interests, and domestic economic benefits from international sales. The purpose of this paper is to balance this largely one-sided treatment of the U.S. government’s dominant position in the international arms market. We discuss several negative consequences and costs associated with U.S. arms sales which call into question the net benefit of the U.S. government’s control over global arms.

Keywords: Arms Sales, Foreign Policy, Monopoly, System Effects

JEL Classification: D42, D74, F51, F52, H12, H56

Suggested Citation

Coyne, Christopher J. and Hall, Abigail R, The Case Against a U.S.-Arms Monopoly (September 15, 2013). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 13-32, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2326060 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2326060

Christopher J. Coyne (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://www.ccoyne.com/

Abigail R Hall

University of Tampa ( email )

401 W Kennedy Blvd Box O
Tampa, FL 33606

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