Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2326060
 


 



The Case Against a U.S.-Arms Monopoly


Christopher J. Coyne


George Mason University - Department of Economics

Abigail R. Hall-Blanco


University of Tampa; George Mason University

September 15, 2013

GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 13-32

Abstract:     
The U.S. government is the dominant player in the global arms market. An existing literature emphasizes the many benefits of an international U.S.-government arms monopoly including: regional and global balance, stability and security, the advancement of U.S. national interests, and domestic economic benefits from international sales. The purpose of this paper is to balance this largely one-sided treatment of the U.S. government’s dominant position in the international arms market. We discuss several negative consequences and costs associated with U.S. arms sales which call into question the net benefit of the U.S. government’s control over global arms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: Arms Sales, Foreign Policy, Monopoly, System Effects

JEL Classification: D42, D74, F51, F52, H12, H56


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Date posted: September 17, 2013 ; Last revised: November 14, 2013

Suggested Citation

Coyne, Christopher J. and Hall-Blanco, Abigail R., The Case Against a U.S.-Arms Monopoly (September 15, 2013). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 13-32. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2326060 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2326060

Contact Information

Christopher J. Coyne (Contact Author)
George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
Abigail R. Hall-Blanco
University of Tampa ( email )
George Mason University ( email )
4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States
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