Immunity of State Officials before the International Criminal Court (ICC): The Indictment of President Al-Bashir

18 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2013

See all articles by Fred Nkusi

Fred Nkusi

Independent Institute of Lay Adventists of Kigali (INILAK)

Date Written: September 16, 2013

Abstract

This Article is devoted to discussing the issuing of an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir, in connection to the alleged international crimes, inter alia, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur. After issuing the arrest warrant by the ICC, a number of legal questions have arisen, which this article is devoted to examining. The first question is whether the ICC jurisdiction could be exercised over a serving Head of state of a non-party to the ICC Statute. To what extent are incumbent Heads of state or Government are protected under customary international law on immunities in respect of international crimes? To what extent can such immunities of sitting Heads of state be disregarded by the ICC? Also, this Paper casts light on the relationship between Articles 27 and 98 of the ICC Statute in the light of non-states parties to the Rome Statute. Furthermore, it discusses the obligation of non-state parties to cooperate in giving effect to the arrest warrant by the ICC. Finally, it critically analyses the legality and effects of the Security Council referral to the ICC with respect to the crimes committed in Darfur.

Suggested Citation

Nkusi, Fred, Immunity of State Officials before the International Criminal Court (ICC): The Indictment of President Al-Bashir (September 16, 2013). Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2326370 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2326370

Fred Nkusi (Contact Author)

Independent Institute of Lay Adventists of Kigali (INILAK) ( email )

http://www.inilak.ac.rw
P.O.Box 6392
Kigali
Rwanda
+250788741993 (Phone)

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