Directors' Conflicts: An Empirical Study

35 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2000

See all articles by Ian Ramsay

Ian Ramsay

Melbourne Law School - University of Melbourne

Geofrey P. Stapledon

University of Melbourne - Law School

Date Written: 2000

Abstract

This chapter has three objectives. First, it addresses some theoretical issues associated with the regulation of directors' conflicts of interest. Second, it reviews the Australian legal framework for regulating directors' conflicts. Third, it presents the results of an empirical study of directors' conflicts in Australia. The study covered disclosure of financial benefits between large Australian companies and their directors. The purpose of the study is to provide some insight into the types of matters which potentially involve directors' conflicts. Sixty-four per cent of the companies in the sample disclosed at least one director-related transaction. By dollar amount, the largest category of director-related transactions is goods or property provided to a company by a director or a director-related entity. Another common category of director-related transactions is services provided to a company by a director-related entity. The chapter identifies the types of services provided by directors by dollar amount and classifies the services according to their type (e.g. management services, legal services and consulting services).

JEL Classification: K22

Suggested Citation

Ramsay, Ian and Stapledon, Geofrey P., Directors' Conflicts: An Empirical Study (2000). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=232642 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.232642

Ian Ramsay (Contact Author)

Melbourne Law School - University of Melbourne ( email )

University Square
185 Pelham Street, Carlton
Victoria, Victoria 3010
Australia
+61 3 8344 5332 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://law.unimelb.edu.au/about/staff/ian-ramsay

Geofrey P. Stapledon

University of Melbourne - Law School ( email )

Victoria 3010
Australia
+61 3 8344 8916 (Phone)
+61 3 8344 9971 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
1,226
Abstract Views
4,330
Rank
35,031
PlumX Metrics