Extraordinary Acquirers

52 Pages Posted: 18 Sep 2013 Last revised: 5 Feb 2015

See all articles by Andrey Golubov

Andrey Golubov

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

Alfred Yawson

University of Adelaide; Financial Research Network (FIRN)

Huizhong Zhang

University of Adelaide - Business School

Date Written: February 4, 2015

Abstract

Firm fixed effects alone explain as much of the variation in acquirer returns as all the firm- and deal-specific characteristics combined. An interquartile range of acquirer fixed effects is over 6%, comparable to the interquartile range of acquirer returns. Acquirer returns persist over time, but mainly at the top end of the distribution. Persistence continues under different chief executive officers (CEOs), and attributes of the broader management team do not explain the fixed effect. Firm-specific heterogeneity in acquirer returns suggests that some organizations are extraordinary acquirers irrespective of the leadership at the top and the deal structures they choose. Implications for the M&A research are discussed.

Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions, Acquirer Returns, Performance Persistence, Fixed Effects

JEL Classification: G14, G34

Suggested Citation

Golubov, Andrey and Yawson, Alfred and Zhang, Huizhong, Extraordinary Acquirers (February 4, 2015). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2326420 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2326420

Andrey Golubov

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6 M5S1S4
Canada

Alfred Yawson (Contact Author)

University of Adelaide ( email )

No 233 North Terrace
Adelaide, South Australia 5005
Australia

Financial Research Network (FIRN)

C/- University of Queensland Business School
St Lucia, 4071 Brisbane
Queensland
Australia

Huizhong Zhang

University of Adelaide - Business School ( email )

10 Pulteney Street
Adelaide, South Australia 5005
Australia

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