The President's Enforcement Power

101 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2013 Last revised: 19 Nov 2013

See all articles by Kate Andrias

Kate Andrias

Columbia University - Law School

Date Written: August 29, 2013

Abstract

Enforcement of law is at the core of the President’s constitutional duty to “take Care” that the laws are faithfully executed, and it is a primary mechanism for effecting national regulatory policy. Yet questions about how presidents oversee agency enforcement activity have received surprisingly little scholarly attention. This Article provides a positive account of the President’s role in administrative enforcement, explores why presidential enforcement has taken the shape it has, and examines the bounds of the President’s enforcement power. It demonstrates that presidential involvement in agency enforcement, though extensive, has been ad hoc, crisis-driven, and frequently opaque. The Article thus reveals the need for institutional design reforms — namely more coordination across agencies and greater disclosure of enforcement policy. The seeds for such reforms can be found in several recent efforts that have yet to be made systematic. Concerns about politicization of law enforcement should not override the considerable benefits that would derive. Rather, by acknowledging the President’s role in, and responsibility for, enforcement, we can better ensure the structure and transparency that promote appropriate presidential influence.

Keywords: Administrative Law, Executive Agencies, Presidential Management, Presidential Power, Separation of Powers, Enforcement, Coordination, Political Oversight

Suggested Citation

Andrias, Kate, The President's Enforcement Power (August 29, 2013). New York University Law Review, Vol. 88, No. 4, p. 101, October 2013 , U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 363, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2326701

Kate Andrias (Contact Author)

Columbia University - Law School ( email )

435 West 116th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States

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