29 Pages Posted: 17 Sep 2013 Last revised: 15 Apr 2015
Date Written: August 3, 2013
We examine the consequences of an organizational reform in Israel that transferred the responsibility for housing arrestees from the Police to the Prison Authority. Using the staggered introduction of the reform in different regions of the country, we document strong evidence that this organizational change led to an increase of 11 percent in the number of arrests and to a decrease of 4 percent in the number of reported crimes, with these effects concentrated in more minor crimes. The reform also led to a decrease in the quality of arrests, measured by the likelihood of being charged following an arrest. These findings are consistent with the idea that the reform externalized the cost of housing arrestees from the Police's perspective, and therefore led the Police to increase its activity against crime.
Keywords: Organizational Structure, Economics of Crime, Jails, Arrests
JEL Classification: H10, K14, K40, L30
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Ater, Itai and Givati, Yehonatan and Rigbi, Oren, Organizational Structure, Police Activity and Crime (August 3, 2013). Journal of Public Economics 115: 62-71 (2014). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2326928 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2326928