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Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence

62 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2013  

Michael A. Livermore

University of Virginia School of Law

Date Written: September 1, 2013

Abstract

The presidential mandate that agency rulemakings be subjected to cost-benefit analysis and regulatory review is one of the most controversial developments in administrative law over the past several decades. There is a prevailing view that the role of cost-benefit analysis in the executive branch is to help facilitate control of agencies by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). This Article challenges that view, arguing that cost-benefit analysis in fact helps preserve agency autonomy in the face of oversight. This effect stems from the constraints imposed on reviewers by the regularization of cost-benefit analysis methodology and the fact that agencies have played a major role in shaping that methodology. The autonomy-preserving effect of cost-benefit analysis has been largely ignored in debates over the institution of regulatory review. Ultimately, cost-benefit analysis has ambiguous effects on agency independence, simultaneously preserving, informing, and constraining agency power.

Keywords: cost-benefit analysis, regulatory review, OIRA, EPA, regulation, unitary executive

Suggested Citation

Livermore, Michael A., Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence (September 1, 2013). University of Chicago Law Review, Forthcoming; Virginia Law and Economics Research Paper No. 2013-09. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2327554

Michael A. Livermore (Contact Author)

University of Virginia School of Law ( email )

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