Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in Latin America: The Case of Argentina

32 Pages Posted: 20 Sep 2013 Last revised: 27 Sep 2014

See all articles by Juan Gonzalez Bertomeu

Juan Gonzalez Bertomeu

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)

Lucia Dalla Pellegrina

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS)

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: September 19, 2013

Abstract

This paper presents an estimation of ideal points for the Justices of the Supreme Court of Argentina for 1984-2007. The estimated ideal points allow us to focus on political cycles in the Court as well as possible coalitions based on presidential appointments. We find strong evidence to support the existence of such coalitions in some periods (such as Menem term) but less so in others. Implications for comparative judicial politics are discussed.

Keywords: constitutional court, constitutional review, empirical analysis, ideal point, Argentina

Suggested Citation

Gonzalez Bertomeu, Juan and Dalla Pellegrina, Lucia and Garoupa, Nuno, Estimating Judicial Ideal Points in Latin America: The Case of Argentina (September 19, 2013). Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS 14-17. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2328392 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2328392

Juan Gonzalez Bertomeu

Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) ( email )

Av. Camino a Sta. Teresa 930
Col. Héroes de Padierna
Mexico City, D.F. 01000, Federal District 01080
Mexico

Lucia Dalla Pellegrina

Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca - Department of Economics, Management and Statistics (DEMS) ( email )

Piazza dell'Ateneo Nuovo, 1
Milan, 20126
Italy

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
164
Abstract Views
856
rank
178,982
PlumX Metrics