Download this Paper Open PDF in Browser

Merger Policy at the Margin: Western Refining's Acquisition of Giant Industries

U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Working Paper No. 319

22 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2013 Last revised: 25 Sep 2013

Nicholas Kreisle

U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics

Date Written: September 19, 2013

Abstract

In May 2007 the Federal Trade Commission failed to win a preliminary injunction in U.S. District Court that would have blocked the merger of two refiners that served Albuquerque, NM and surrounding areas. This study compares estimates of the post-merger price effect to the price effects predicted by economic experts on both sides of the case. I find little scope to interpret the evidence as consistent with an anticompetitive post-merger price effect. I also highlight difficulties involved in econometrically identifying small effects even with an abundance of pricing data.

Keywords: Merger Retrospectives, Petroleum Industry

JEL Classification: L10, L41, L71

Suggested Citation

Kreisle, Nicholas, Merger Policy at the Margin: Western Refining's Acquisition of Giant Industries (September 19, 2013). U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Working Paper No. 319. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2328427

Nicholas Kreisle (Contact Author)

U.S. Federal Trade Commission - Bureau of Economics ( email )

601 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20580
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
49
Abstract Views
436