U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Working Paper No. 319
22 Pages Posted: 21 Sep 2013 Last revised: 25 Sep 2013
Date Written: September 19, 2013
In May 2007 the Federal Trade Commission failed to win a preliminary injunction in U.S. District Court that would have blocked the merger of two refiners that served Albuquerque, NM and surrounding areas. This study compares estimates of the post-merger price effect to the price effects predicted by economic experts on both sides of the case. I find little scope to interpret the evidence as consistent with an anticompetitive post-merger price effect. I also highlight difficulties involved in econometrically identifying small effects even with an abundance of pricing data.
Keywords: Merger Retrospectives, Petroleum Industry
JEL Classification: L10, L41, L71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Kreisle, Nicholas, Merger Policy at the Margin: Western Refining's Acquisition of Giant Industries (September 19, 2013). U.S. Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics, Working Paper No. 319. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2328427