Safeguards and the Perils of Preferential Trade Agreements: Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures

World Trade Review, vol. 13(2), pp. 179-227

64 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2013 Last revised: 18 Dec 2014

See all articles by Chad P. Bown

Chad P. Bown

Peterson Institute for International Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Mark Wu

Harvard Law School

Date Written: April 2014

Abstract

The legal-economic implications of how WTO members apply an import-restricting safeguard measure become more complex in light of the increasing web of trade concessions undertaken through their preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in addition to their WTO commitments. This paper examines a number of complex issues that arose in the WTO litigation between five new PTA partners through the Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures disputes. First, we highlight the difficulties in assessing the extent to which safeguards imposed following a PTA are the result of PTA concessions relative to developments that pre-date or are otherwise unrelated to the PTA. Second, we analyze the WTO Panel decision through which a number of previously unresolved questions in the WTO’s safeguards jurisprudence arose. Third, we identify how safeguard-related provisions within a PTA may themselves give rise to constraints that subsequently affect how a country may apply safeguards made available under the WTO Agreements, and we describe some implications for PTA design and negotiation. Finally, we examine the broader implications that arise from the interplay of PTAs, safeguards, and dispute settlement in light of the availability of both relatively substitutable policy instruments and dispute resolution forums.

Keywords: WTO, dispute settlement, safeguards, preferential trade agreements, parallelism, CAFTA-DR

JEL Classification: F13

Suggested Citation

Bown, Chad P. and Wu, Mark, Safeguards and the Perils of Preferential Trade Agreements: Dominican Republic – Safeguard Measures (April 2014). World Trade Review, vol. 13(2), pp. 179-227, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2329336 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2329336

Chad P. Bown (Contact Author)

Peterson Institute for International Economics ( email )

1750 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Mark Wu

Harvard Law School ( email )

Griswold Hall Room 302
1525 Massachusetts Ave.
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
149
Abstract Views
1,841
Rank
369,146
PlumX Metrics