Endogenous Property Rights

49 Pages Posted: 23 Sep 2013 Last revised: 15 Oct 2016

See all articles by Carmine Guerriero

Carmine Guerriero

Department of Economics, University of Bologna

Date Written: April 3, 2016

Abstract

Although property rights are key, their determinants are still poorly understood. When property is fully protected, some potential buyers with valuation higher than that of original owners are inefficiently excluded from trade due to transaction costs. When property rights are weak, low-valuation potential buyers inefficiently expropriate original owners. The trade-off between these two misallocations implies that the protection of property will be stronger the more heterogeneous the potential buyers' preferences are. This implication holds true when part of the population has higher political influence on institutional design, when transaction costs are determined by either market power or asymmetric information, and when I consider the disincentive effect of weak property rights. Moreover, it is consistent with the relationships between measures of ethno-linguistic, genetic, and religious diversity and novel data on the rules on adverse possession and on government takings of real property in 126 jurisdictions.

Keywords: Property rights, markets, expropriation, preference heterogeneity

JEL Classification: D23, L11, P14, Z10

Suggested Citation

Guerriero, Carmine, Endogenous Property Rights (April 3, 2016). Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2013-53; Amsterdam Center for Law & Economics Working Paper No. 2013-13. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2329582 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2329582

Carmine Guerriero (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, University of Bologna ( email )

Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy

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