24 Pages Posted: 25 Sep 2013 Last revised: 3 Apr 2014
Date Written: September 23, 2013
We present a review of the Irish banking collapse, detailing its origins in a confluence of events. We suggest that the very concentrated nature of the Irish banking sector which will emerge from the policy decisions taken as a consequence of the collapse runs a risk of a second crisis. We survey the literature on size and efficiency and suggest some alternative policy approaches.
Keywords: Banking, Ireland, Regulation, Collapse
JEL Classification: G21, G28
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Gurdgiev, Constantin and Larkin, Charles James and Lucey, Brian M., Learning from the Irish Experience – A Clinical Case Study in Banking Failure (September 23, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2329815 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2329815