Worker Participation and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany and Britain

Posted: 11 Sep 2000

See all articles by Stanley Siebert

Stanley Siebert

Business School, University of Birmingham; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)

Xiangdong Wei

Lingnan College

John T. Addison

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Joachim Wagner

University of Lueneburg - Institute of Economics; Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

The Freeman-Lazear works council/worker involvement model is assessed over two distinct industrial relations regimes. In non union British establishments our measures of employee involvement are associated with improved economic performance, whereas for unionized plants negative results are detected. The suggestion is that local distributive bargaining can cause the wrong level of worker involvement to be chosen. Also consistent with the model is our finding that mandatory works councils do not impair, and may even improve, the performance of larger German establishments. Yet smaller plants with works councils under-perform, illustrating the problem of tailoring mandates to fit heterogeneous populations.

JEL Classification: J51, J53

Suggested Citation

Siebert, Stanley and Wei, Xiangdong and Addison, John T. and Wagner, Joachim, Worker Participation and Firm Performance: Evidence from Germany and Britain. British Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 38, No. 1, March 2000. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=233033

Stanley Siebert

Business School, University of Birmingham ( email )

Edgbaston
Birmingham, B15 2TT
United Kingdom
(44) 1214146698 (Phone)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) ( email )

2 Lord North Street, Westminster
London, SW1P 3LB
United Kingdom

Xiangdong Wei (Contact Author)

Lingnan College ( email )

8 Castle Peak Road
Hong Kong
China

John T. Addison

University of South Carolina - Moore School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

The Francis M. Hipp Building
1705 College Street
Columbia, SC 29208
United States
803-777-7400 (Phone)
803-777-6876 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://mooreschool.sc.edu/moore/economics/profiles/addison.htm

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Joachim Wagner

University of Lueneburg - Institute of Economics ( email )

PO Box 2440
D-21314 Luneburg
Germany
+49 4131 677 2330 (Phone)
+49 4131 677 2026 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.uni-lueneburg.de/wifo

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Economics ( email )

Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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