Do Managers Manipulate Earnings Prior to Management Buyouts?

50 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2013 Last revised: 9 Oct 2015

See all articles by Yaping Mao

Yaping Mao

Tilburg University

Luc Renneboog

Tilburg University - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 26, 2013

Abstract

To address the question as to whether managers manipulate accounting numbers downwards prior to management buyouts (MBOs), we implement an industry-adjusted buyout-specific approach and receive an affirmative answer. In UK buyout companies, negative earnings manipulation (understating the earnings prior to the deal) often occurs, both by means of accrual management and real earnings management. We demonstrate that MBOs are significantly more frequently subject to negative manipulation than leveraged buyouts (LBOs). In non-buyout firms, positive earnings management frequently occurs because it affects managers’ bonuses and the likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ expectations which may trigger a positive market reaction. By means of an instrumental variables approach, we examine competing incentives affecting the degree and size of earnings manipulation. Our evidence implies that the (ex ante) perceived likelihood that an MBO will be undertaken has a strong significant effect on negative earnings management, while the external borrowing capacity of the buyout company is not determined by standard capital structure factors, such as earnings numbers. The implementation of the revised UK Corporate Governance Code of 2003 has somewhat reduced the degree of both accrual earnings and real management in MBOs, but since then other manipulation techniques (related to production costs and asset revaluations) are more frequently used, which may be induced by the fact that these manipulation methods are more difficult to detect.

Keywords: Accounting manipulation, earnings management, leveraged buyout, management buyout, LBO, MBO

JEL Classification: G30, G32, M41

Suggested Citation

Mao, Yaping and Renneboog, Luc, Do Managers Manipulate Earnings Prior to Management Buyouts? (September 26, 2013). ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 383/2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2330784

Yaping Mao

Tilburg University ( email )

PO Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE Ti
Netherlands

Luc Renneboog (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Department of Finance ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Warandelaan 2
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+13 31 466 8210 (Phone)
+13 31 466 2875 (Fax)

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

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