Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data

Bailey, Michael, Strezhnev, Anton and Voeten, Erik., Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data. Journal of Conflict Resolution (2015) DOI: 10.1177/0022002715595700

37 Pages Posted: 26 Sep 2013 Last revised: 25 Aug 2015

See all articles by Michael Bailey

Michael Bailey

Georgetown University - Department of Government

Anton Strezhnev

University of Chicago - Department of Political Science

Erik Voeten

Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS)

Date Written: February 8, 2015

Abstract

UN General Assembly votes have become the standard data source for measures of the degree to which states have common preferences over foreign policy. Almost without exception, those papers use dyadic indicators of voting similarity between states. We propose a dynamic ordinal spatial model to estimate state ideal points from 1946-2012 on a single dimension that reflects state positions towards the U.S. led liberal order. We use information about the content of the UN's agenda to make estimates comparable across time. Compared to existing measures, our estimates better separate signal from noise in identifying foreign policy shifts, have greater face validity, allow for better inter-temporal comparisons, are less sensitive to shifts in the UN's agenda, and are strongly correlated with measures of liberalism. We show that the choice of method is consequential with a replication of a prominent application to the democratic peace.

Keywords: United Nations, Ideal Points, International Organizations, State Preferences

JEL Classification: K33, N40

Suggested Citation

Bailey, Michael and Strezhnev, Anton and Voeten, Erik, Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data (February 8, 2015). Bailey, Michael, Strezhnev, Anton and Voeten, Erik., Estimating Dynamic State Preferences from United Nations Voting Data. Journal of Conflict Resolution (2015) DOI: 10.1177/0022002715595700, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2330913 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2330913

Michael Bailey

Georgetown University - Department of Government ( email )

ICC, Suite 681
Washington, DC 20057-1034
United States
202-687-6021 (Phone)
202-687-5858 (Fax)

Anton Strezhnev

University of Chicago - Department of Political Science ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.antonstrezhnev.com

Erik Voeten (Contact Author)

Georgetown University - Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service (SFS) ( email )

Washington, DC 20057
United States

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
2,017
Abstract Views
7,128
Rank
13,918
PlumX Metrics