The Strategy of Manipulating Joint Decision-Making

10 Pages Posted: 27 Sep 2013 Last revised: 14 Oct 2014

See all articles by Jin Yeub Kim

Jin Yeub Kim

Yonsei University - School of Economics

Heung Jin Kwon

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Date Written: January 21, 2014

Abstract

We study a model of strategic persuasion based on the theory of cheap talk, in which a better-informed agent manipulates two decision-makers' joint decision on alternative proposals. With the heterogeneity of two decision-makers' value of the outside option, only the decision-maker with the better outside option is critical in determining whether communication is truthful, overselling, or ineffective.

Keywords: Collective decision-making, Communication, Information

JEL Classification: C72, D70, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Kim, Jin Yeub and Kwon, Heung Jin, The Strategy of Manipulating Joint Decision-Making (January 21, 2014). Economics Letters, Vol. 123, 2014, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2331076 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2331076

Jin Yeub Kim (Contact Author)

Yonsei University - School of Economics ( email )

Seoul
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Heung Jin Kwon

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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