(Self-)Selection, Incentives and Resources – A Personnel Economics Perspective on Academia and Higher Education

University of Zurich, Institute of Business Administration, UZH Business Working Paper No. 338

19 Pages Posted: 3 Oct 2013

See all articles by Kerstin Pull

Kerstin Pull

University of Tuebingen - School of Business and Economics

Uschi Backes-Gellner

University of Zurich - Institute for Business Administration; Swiss Leading House

Date Written: September 26, 2013

Abstract

In our paper, we view academia from a personnel economics perspective and analyze three important questions: (1) Who decides to become a researcher and what are the mechanisms of selection and self-selection that drive this process? (2) What makes re-searchers stay motivated and how can they be incentivized? (3) What other factors, aside from incentives, determine a researcher’s productivity? In our selective review of the literature, we show how personnel economics has contributed and may further contribute to an enhanced understanding of the functioning of the academic system. First, however, we elaborate on a researcher’s outcome dimensions, why these need to be measured by adequate output indicators and why differing inputs have to be taken into account. Here, too, personnel economics may contribute since it highlights the virtues and potential pitfalls associated with the identification of relevant outcome dimensions and potential measurement problems, and since it provides us with the necessary tools to assess productivity.

Suggested Citation

Pull, Kerstin and Backes-Gellner, Uschi, (Self-)Selection, Incentives and Resources – A Personnel Economics Perspective on Academia and Higher Education (September 26, 2013). University of Zurich, Institute of Business Administration, UZH Business Working Paper No. 338. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2331320 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2331320

Kerstin Pull

University of Tuebingen - School of Business and Economics ( email )

Nauklerstr. 47
Tuebingen, D-72074
Germany

Uschi Backes-Gellner (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Institute for Business Administration ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
8032 Zurich
Switzerland
+41 44 6344281 (Phone)
+41 44 6344370 (Fax)

Swiss Leading House ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland

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