Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis

67 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2013 Last revised: 12 Mar 2023

See all articles by Patrick Bolton

Patrick Bolton

Imperial College London; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Xavier Freixas

Universitat Pompeu Fabra; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)

Leonardo Gambacorta

Bank for International Settlements (BIS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Paolo Emilio Mistrulli

Bank of Italy

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2013

Abstract

We study how relationship lending and transaction lending vary over the business cycle. We develop a model in which relationship banks gather information on their borrowers, which allows them to provide loans for profitable firms during a crisis. Due to the services they provide, operating costs of relationship- banks are higher than those of transaction-banks. In our model, where relationship-banks compete with transaction-banks, a key result is that relationship-banks charge a higher intermediation spread in normal times, but offer continuation-lending at more favorable terms than transaction banks to profitable firms in a crisis. Using detailed credit register information for Italian banks before and after the Lehman Brothers' default, we are able to study how relationship and transaction-banks responded to the crisis and we test existing theories of relationship banking. Our empirical analysis confirms the basic prediction of the model that relationship banks charged a higher spread before the crisis, offered more favorable continuation-lending terms in response to the crisis, and suffered fewer defaults, thus confirming the informational advantage of relationship banking.

Suggested Citation

Bolton, Patrick and Freixas, Xavier and Gambacorta, Leonardo and Mistrulli, Paolo Emilio, Relationship and Transaction Lending in a Crisis (September 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19467, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2332519

Patrick Bolton (Contact Author)

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org

Xavier Freixas

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Barcelona, 08005
Spain
+34 93 542 2726 (Phone)
+34 93 542 1746 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.es/~freixas

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.es/~freixas/more/personal1.htm

Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas, 25-27
Barcelona, Barcelona 08005
Spain

Leonardo Gambacorta

Bank for International Settlements (BIS) ( email )

Centralbahnplatz 2
Basel, Basel-Stadt 4002
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Paolo Emilio Mistrulli

Bank of Italy ( email )

Via Nazionale 91
00184 Roma
Italy

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