Taxpayer Search for Information: Implications for Rational Attention

48 Pages Posted: 28 Sep 2013 Last revised: 27 Mar 2025

See all articles by Jeffrey L. Hoopes

Jeffrey L. Hoopes

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Accounting Area

Daniel Reck

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Joel B. Slemrod

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 2013

Abstract

We examine novel data on searches for capital-gains-tax-related information to determine when and how taxpayers acquire information. We find strong seasonal increases in information search around tax filing deadlines, suggesting that taxpayers seek information to comply with tax laws. Positive correlations between stock market activity and information search and year-end spikes in information search on capital losses suggest that taxpayers seek information for tax planning purposes. Policy changes and news events cause noteworthy information search. Overall, these data suggest that taxpayers are not always fully informed, but that rational attention and exogenous shocks to tax salience drive taxpayer information search.

Suggested Citation

Hoopes, Jeffrey L. and Reck, Daniel and Slemrod, Joel B., Taxpayer Search for Information: Implications for Rational Attention (September 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19482, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2332554

Jeffrey L. Hoopes (Contact Author)

University of North Carolina (UNC) at Chapel Hill - Accounting Area ( email )

McColl Building
Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3490
United States

Daniel Reck

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

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United Kingdom

Joel B. Slemrod

University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )

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