42 Pages Posted: 29 Sep 2013
Date Written: September 2013
In Crawford and Sobel (1982) (CS), a sender (S) uses cheap talk to persuade a receiver (R) to select an action as profitable to S as possible. This paper shows that the presence of an outside option – that is, allowing R to avoid taking any action, yielding state-independent reservation utilities to R and S – has an important qualitative impact on the results. Contrary to CS, in this model, the informativeness of communication is not always decreasing in the level of conflict of interest. Relatedly, communication can be more informative than in CS.
Keywords: Cheap Talk, Information Transmission, Experts
JEL Classification: D82, D83
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Chiba, Saori and Leong, Kaiwen, Cheap Talk with Outside Options (September 2013). Department of Management, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia Working Paper No. 16/2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2332689 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2332689