Vietnam Through Chinese Eyes: Divergent Accountability in Single-Party Regimes

Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Regime ... edited by Martin K. Dimitrov, 2013

Posted: 30 Sep 2013

See all articles by Regina M. Abrami

Regina M. Abrami

Harvard Business School

Edmund J. Malesky

Duke University, Political Science

Yu Zheng

Fudan University

Date Written: September 30, 2013

Abstract

This volume aims to identify the foundations of communist regime resilience. Some chapters focus on economic and political reforms as mechanisms for resilience, others on strategies for inclusiveness, and still others on ideology and legitimacy. We approach this important issue by analyzing formal institutions of horizontal and vertical accountability in China and Vietnam. We find important differences that are becoming more salient over time. Yet both sets of accountability institutions serve very resilient single-party regimes, protecting rather than threatening them.

While our finding supports this volume’s main conclusion that institutional design plays a key role in shaping the form and degree of a regime’s resilience, our comparative cases also show that institutions going by the same name may operate by quite different rules. What is understood as order making in one country may therefore be viewed as a cause of instability in another.

Keywords: authoritarian institutions, china, vietnam, communist parties

Suggested Citation

Abrami, Regina M. and Malesky, Edmund J. and Zheng, Yu, Vietnam Through Chinese Eyes: Divergent Accountability in Single-Party Regimes (September 30, 2013). Why Communism Did Not Collapse: Understanding Authoritarian Regime ... edited by Martin K. Dimitrov, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2333335

Regina M. Abrami

Harvard Business School ( email )

Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States

Edmund J. Malesky (Contact Author)

Duke University, Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

Yu Zheng

Fudan University ( email )

220 Handan Road
Shanghai, 200433
China

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