Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2333859
 


 



Beyond Naked Exclusion: Exclusive Dealing after Dentsply


Robert B. Kulick


Government of the United States of America - Bureau of the Census

October 2013


Abstract:     
Although many have come to regard the collection of models that predict anticompetitive consequences from strategic conduct by dominant firms as a “post-Chicago” revolution, the canonical post-Chicago “Naked Exclusion” theory of exclusive dealing maintains the fundamental Chicago structure where exclusive dealing is modeled as a contract driven quid pro quo. However, in the highly influential case U.S. v. Dentsply, the Third Circuit analyzed exclusive dealing in terms of a discriminatory refusal to deal where buyers received no compensation for exclusivity. This article develops a model of exclusive dealing consistent with Dentsply and many other major antitrust cases.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 23

Keywords: Naked Exclusion, Exclusive Dealing, Vertical Restraints, post-Chicago antitrust, Dentsply, Discriminatory Refusal to Deal

JEL Classification: L42, K21


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Date posted: October 1, 2013 ; Last revised: October 10, 2013

Suggested Citation

Kulick, Robert B., Beyond Naked Exclusion: Exclusive Dealing after Dentsply (October 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2333859 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2333859

Contact Information

Robert B. Kulick (Contact Author)
Government of the United States of America - Bureau of the Census ( email )
4600 Silver Hill Road
Washington, DC 20233
United States
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