Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes

Posted: 13 Jul 2000

See all articles by James M. Walker

James M. Walker

Indiana University - Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis

Roy Gardner

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics; Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) - Department of Economics

Elinor Ostrom

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA); Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Political Science

Andrew Herr

Saint Vincent College

Abstract

We analyse and empirically examine a multi-level common-pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective-choice level game and an operational-level game. In the collective-choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency relative to a baseline with no opportunity for collective choice, but the distributional consequences of the rules differ. To understand the process by which efficiency is improved better, we examine four predictive theories related to proposals, votes, and outcomes.

JEL Classification: C92, D70

Suggested Citation

Walker, James M. and Gardner, Roy John and Ostrom, Elinor and Herr, Andrew, Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=233427

James M. Walker (Contact Author)

Indiana University - Department of Economics and Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis ( email )

Wylie Hall 105
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-2760 (Phone)
812-855-3736 (Fax)

Roy John Gardner

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Economics ( email )

Wylie Hall
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States

Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) - Department of Economics ( email )

Bloomington, IN 47405
United States
812-855-6383 (Phone)
812-855-3736 (Fax)

Elinor Ostrom

Indiana University Bloomington - School of Public & Environmental Affairs (SPEA) ( email )

1315 East Tenth Street
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

Indiana University Bloomington - Department of Political Science

Bloomington, IN
United States

Andrew Herr

Saint Vincent College ( email )

300 Fraser Purchase Road
Latrobe, PA 15650-2690

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
1,005
PlumX Metrics