Teams Punish Less

20 Pages Posted: 2 Oct 2013

See all articles by Heike Auerswald

Heike Auerswald

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management

Carsten Schmidt

University of Mannheim - Sonderforschungsbereich 504

Marcel P. Thum

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute; Institute for Corruption Studies

Gaute Torsvik

University of Bergen - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Date Written: September 30, 2013

Abstract

Many decisions in politics and business are made by teams rather than by single individuals. In contrast, economic models typically assume an individual rational decision maker. A rapidly growing body of (experimental) literature investigates team decisions in different settings. We study team decisions in a public goods contribution game with a costly punishment option and compare it to the behavior of individuals in a laboratory experiment. We also consider different team decision-making rules (unanimity, majority). We find that teams contribute significantly more and punish less than individuals, regardless of the team decision rule. Overall, teams yield higher payoffs than individuals.

Keywords: group decision making, public good, experiment, punishment

JEL Classification: H540, Q540, Q580

Suggested Citation

Auerswald, Heike and Schmidt, Carsten and Thum, Marcel and Torsvik, Gaute, Teams Punish Less (September 30, 2013). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4406. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2334658

Heike Auerswald

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management ( email )

Mommsenstrasse 13
Dresden, D-01062
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.tu-dresden.de/wwvwlfw

Carsten Schmidt

University of Mannheim - Sonderforschungsbereich 504 ( email )

Mannheim 68131
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.sfb504.uni-mannheim.de/~cschmidt

Marcel Thum (Contact Author)

Dresden University of Technology - Faculty of Economics and Business Management ( email )

Mommsenstrasse 13
Dresden, D-01062
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, 01069
Germany

Institute for Corruption Studies

Stevenson Hall 425
Normal, IL 61790-4200
United States

Gaute Torsvik

University of Bergen - Department of Economics ( email )

Fosswinckelsgt. 6
N-5007 Bergen, 5007
Norway
55589225 (Phone)
55589210 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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