Modeling Decision Making Considering Collective Versus Individual Interests in Public Health

27 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2013

See all articles by Eduardo Massad

Eduardo Massad

University of São Paulo (USP)

Armando da Rocha

Research on Artificial and Natural Intelligence (RANI)

Marcelo Burattini

University of São Paulo (USP)

Claudio Struchiner

Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ)

Date Written: October 3, 2013

Abstract

Objective. The objective of this work is to examine decision making in public health, considering the conflict between collective and individual interests.

Study design. This is a theoretical work in which a mathematical model is proposed.

Methods. Here we propose a mathematical model of decision-making that takes this conflict into account. The model assumes that the probability of deciding in favor of preventive or curative actions depends on the ratio of acceptance/compliance, as calculated for opportunity costs and benefits.

Results. The model shows that the perceived fairness of the action increases as its acceptance increases relative to its compliance. Conflict is generated by the tension between acceptance and compliance and turns decision making into a difficult task.

Conclusions. The acceptance of a public health action increases as its personal cost decreases relative to its perceived social benefits. On the other hand, compliance with the action increases as the perceived social cost increases relative to personal benefits.

Keywords: decision-making, preventive actions, curative actions, neuroeconomics, mathematical modeling, public health

Suggested Citation

Massad, Eduardo and da Rocha, Armando and Burattini, Marcelo and Struchiner, Claudio, Modeling Decision Making Considering Collective Versus Individual Interests in Public Health (October 3, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2335633 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2335633

Eduardo Massad (Contact Author)

University of São Paulo (USP) ( email )

Brazil

Armando Da Rocha

Research on Artificial and Natural Intelligence (RANI) ( email )

Rua Tenente Ary Aps, 172
Jundiai, 13207-110
Brazil

Marcelo Burattini

University of São Paulo (USP) ( email )

Rua Luciano Gualberto, 315
São Paulo, São Paulo 14800-901
Brazil

Claudio Struchiner

Oswaldo Cruz Foundation (FIOCRUZ) ( email )

Rio de Janeiro
Brazil

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