66 Pages Posted: 14 Oct 2013
Date Written: October 4, 2013
We study business groups’ internal capital markets using a unique data set on intra-group lending in Chile (1990-2009). In line with groups’ financing advantage, firms that borrow internally have higher investment, leverage, and ROE than other firms. At the margin, controlling shareholders have higher cash-flow rights in borrowing firms than in lending firms. However, there is no robust evidence of minority shareholders losing out from intra-group loans as tunneling predicts. Our evidence is consistent with the idea that strict regulation and disclosure requirements for intra-group loans, which are features of the Chilean market, reduce the risk of expropriation in pyramids.
Keywords: business groups, internal capital markets, expropriation
JEL Classification: G30, G32
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Buchuk, David and Larrain, Borja and Prem, Mounu and Urzúa I., Francisco, The Internal Capital Markets of Business Groups: Evidence from Intra-Group Loans (October 4, 2013). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2335974