Is Corporate Governance in China Related to Performance Persistence?

35 Pages Posted: 6 Oct 2013

See all articles by Lars Helge Hass

Lars Helge Hass

Lancaster University - Management School

Sofia Johan

Florida Atlantic University - Finance; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Denis Schweizer

Concordia University

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 1, 2013

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between performance persistence and corporate governance (as proxied for by board characteristics and shareholder structure). We document systematic differences in performance persistence across listed companies in China during 2001-2011, and empirically demonstrate that firms with better corporate governance show higher performance persistence. The results are robust over both the short- and long-term. Performance persistence is an important factor in refinancing, and it can lower companies’ costs of borrowing.

Keywords: Board Structure, China, Corporate Governance, Performance Persistence

JEL Classification: G3, P3

Suggested Citation

Hass, Lars Helge and Johan, Sofia A. and Schweizer, Denis, Is Corporate Governance in China Related to Performance Persistence? (September 1, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2336058 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2336058

Lars Helge Hass

Lancaster University - Management School ( email )

Bailrigg
Lancaster, LA1 4YX
United Kingdom

Sofia A. Johan (Contact Author)

Florida Atlantic University - Finance ( email )

777 Glades Rd
Boca Raton, FL 33431
United States

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Denis Schweizer

Concordia University ( email )

1455 de Maisonneuve Blvd. W.
Montreal, Quebec H3G 1M8
Canada
+1 (514) 848-2424 ext. 2926 (Phone)
+1 (514) 848-4500 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.concordia.ca/jmsb/faculty/denis-schweizer.html

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