In the Shadow of a Giant: Medicare's Influence on Private Physician Payments

94 Pages Posted: 5 Oct 2013 Last revised: 16 Oct 2024

See all articles by Jeffrey P. Clemens

Jeffrey P. Clemens

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics; NBER

Joshua D. Gottlieb

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Chicago

Date Written: October 2013

Abstract

We demonstrate Medicare's influence on private insurers' payments for physicians' services. Using a large administrative change in payments for surgical versus medical care, we find that private prices follow Medicare's lead. A $1 change in Medicare's fees moved private prices by $1.16. A second set of Medicare payment changes, which generated area-specific reimbursement shocks, had a similar effect on private sector prices. Medicare's influence is strongest in areas with concentrated insurers, small physician groups, and competitive physician markets. The public sector's influences on system-wide resource allocation and costs extend well beyond the share of health expenditures it finances directly.

Suggested Citation

Clemens, Jeffrey P. and Gottlieb, Joshua D. and Gottlieb, Joshua D., In the Shadow of a Giant: Medicare's Influence on Private Physician Payments (October 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19503, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2336368

Jeffrey P. Clemens

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Department of Economics ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
La Jolla, CA 92093-0508
United States

HOME PAGE: http://econweb.ucsd.edu/~j1clemens/

NBER ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Joshua D. Gottlieb

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

HOME PAGE: http://papers.nber.org/authors/joshua_gottlieb

University of Chicago ( email )

1307 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.gottlieb.ca/

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