Migration between Platforms

23 Pages Posted: 7 Oct 2013

See all articles by Gary Biglaiser

Gary Biglaiser

University of North Carolina

Jacques Cremer

Toulouse School of Economics

Andre Veiga

Imperial College London

Multiple version iconThere are 4 versions of this paper

Date Written: October 1, 2013

Abstract

We develop a model of dynamic platform formation under positive platform externalities. Users can switch between an incumbent and entrant platforms, switching opportunities arise stochastically and users can choose whether to accept or reject an opportunity to switch. For homogeneous users, we characterize the incumbency advantage implied by a given equilibrium realization of the switching process. For linear utility, incumbency advantage increases in the mean and dispersion of the incumbent’s share during the switching process, which captures the momentum and coordination of the process. Heterogeneity in preferences may lead some users to delay their switching or never switch at all. Assuming that switching opportunities arrive according to a Poisson process, users switch to the entrant platform.

Keywords: Platform Formation, Migration, Standardization and Compatibility, Industry

JEL Classification: D85, L14, R23, L15, L16

Suggested Citation

Biglaiser, Gary and Cremer, Jacques and Veiga, Andre, Migration between Platforms (October 1, 2013). NET Institute Working Paper No. 13-18, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2336410 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2336410

Gary Biglaiser

University of North Carolina ( email )

Chapel Hill, NC 27599
United States
919-966-4884 (Phone)
919-966-4986 (Fax)

Jacques Cremer

Toulouse School of Economics ( email )

1 Esplanade de l'Université
Toulouse Cedex 06, 31080
France

Andre Veiga (Contact Author)

Imperial College London ( email )

South Kensington Campus
Exhibition Road
London, Greater London SW7 2AZ
United Kingdom

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