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Courts and Constitutional Transition: Lessons from the Turkish Case

11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 666-701 (2013)

UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 13-34

Posted: 8 Oct 2013  

Asli U. Bali

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

Date Written: October 7, 2013

Abstract

Judicial independence is understood as a cornerstone of rule-of-law and, as such, an essential component of democratic transitions. But in contexts of democratization, the definition of judicial independence may require refinement to take account of the special challenges of moving from the rule of the few to the rule of the many. In particular, an independent judiciary may stall legislative and constitutional reform by engaging in a form of constitutional review designed to shield elite preferences from democratic reversal. This article explores this problem through a detailed examination of a recent set of controversial constitutional cases in Turkey to illustrate the risks of a narrow definition of judicial independence and explore the appropriate balance between autonomy and accountability of the judiciary in periods of democratic transition or democratic consolidation.

Keywords: Turkish Constitutional Court (TCC), democratic transitions, judicial accountability, apex courts, judicial autonomy

Suggested Citation

Bali, Asli U., Courts and Constitutional Transition: Lessons from the Turkish Case (October 7, 2013). 11 International Journal of Constitutional Law 666-701 (2013); UCLA School of Law Research Paper No. 13-34. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337070

Asli U. Bali (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )

385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States

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