Product Market Competition, Union Organizing Activity, and Employer Resistence

41 Pages Posted: 10 Jul 2000 Last revised: 1 Sep 2010

See all articles by John M. Abowd

John M. Abowd

U.S. Census Bureau; Cornell University Department of Economics; Labor Dynamics Institute; School of Industrial and Labor Relations; NBER (on leave); CREST; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Henry S. Farber

Princeton University; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Date Written: May 1990

Abstract

We develop and estimate a model of the union's optimal extent oforganizing activity that accounts for the decision of employers regardingresistance to union organizing. The central exogenous variable in theanalysis is the quantity of quasi-rents per worker available to be splitbetween unions and employers.We measure available quasi-rents per worker as the difference perworker between total industry revenues net of raw materials costs and laborcosts evaluated at the opportunity cost of the workers. Using two-digitindustry level data for thirty-five U.S. industries for the period 1955through 1986, we find that both organizing activity and employer resistanceto unionization are positively related to available quasi-rents per worker.However, there is still a strong negative trend in union organizing activityand a strong positive trend in employer resistance after controlling forquasi-rents per worker. Thus, the explanation for the decline in unionorganizing activity and the increase in employer resistance to unionizationsince the mid 1970's lies elsewhere.

Suggested Citation

Abowd, John Maron and Farber, Henry S., Product Market Competition, Union Organizing Activity, and Employer Resistence (May 1990). NBER Working Paper No. w3353, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=233712

John Maron Abowd (Contact Author)

U.S. Census Bureau ( email )

4600 Silver Hill Road
Washington, DC 20233
United States
+1.301.763.5880 (Phone)

Cornell University Department of Economics ( email )

261 Ives Hall
Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.cornell.edu

Labor Dynamics Institute ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/LDI/

School of Industrial and Labor Relations ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853-3901
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/LDI/

NBER (on leave) ( email )

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

CREST ( email )

92245 Malakoff Cedex
France

HOME PAGE: http://www.crest.fr/

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

Henry S. Farber

Princeton University ( email )

Industrial Relations Section
Firestone Library
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States
609-258-4044 (Phone)
609-258-2907 (Fax)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
25
Abstract Views
1,012
PlumX Metrics