Testing the Logic of Strategic Defection: The Case of the Philippine Supreme Court — An Empirical Analysis (1986–2010)

Laarni Escresa & Nuno Garoupa (2013) Testing the Logic of Strategic Defection: The Case of the Philippine Supreme Court -- An Empirical Analysis (1986–2010), Asian Journal of Political Science, 21:2, 189-212, 2013

Posted: 10 Oct 2013

See all articles by Laarni Escresa

Laarni Escresa

University of the Philippines, Diliman - School of Economics

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: October 8, 2013

Abstract

It has been argued that, under certain conditions, judges are motivated to engage in strategic defection against their appointer once they perceive the latter to be losing effective power. This behaviour should generate a clustering of decisions unfavourable to the incumbent administration at the end of their term, when they are perceived to be weak. In this article we investigate empirically the application of the strategic defection model on the Philippine Supreme Court in the period 1986–2010. Our results do not seem to strongly corroborate this model. We discuss these empirical results in the context of the Philippines' unstable democracy and general implications for comparative judicial politics.

Keywords: Strategic Defection, Judicial Politics, Democracy, Philippines

JEL Classification: K00, K4

Suggested Citation

Escresa, Laarni and Garoupa, Nuno, Testing the Logic of Strategic Defection: The Case of the Philippine Supreme Court — An Empirical Analysis (1986–2010) (October 8, 2013). Laarni Escresa & Nuno Garoupa (2013) Testing the Logic of Strategic Defection: The Case of the Philippine Supreme Court -- An Empirical Analysis (1986–2010), Asian Journal of Political Science, 21:2, 189-212, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2337666

Laarni Escresa

University of the Philippines, Diliman - School of Economics ( email )

Encarnacion Hall
F. M. Guerrero corner S. Osmena Sts
U.P. Diliman, Quezon City
Philippines

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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