A Step in the Wrong Direction: An Appraisal of the Zero-Intelligence Model of Government Formation

15 Pages Posted: 17 Oct 2013

See all articles by Lanny W. Martin

Lanny W. Martin

Rice University - Department of Political Science

Georg Vanberg

Duke University - Department of Political Science

Date Written: October 16, 2013

Abstract

In a recent article in the Journal of Politics, Golder, Golder, and Siegel argue that models of government formation should be rebuilt "from the ground up." They propose to do so with a "zero-intelligence" model of government formation, which they claim makes no theoretical assumptions beyond the requirement that a potential government, to be chosen, must be preferred by all its members and a legislative majority to the incumbent administration. They also claim that, empirically, their model does significantly better than existing models in predicting formation outcomes. We disagree with both claims. Theoretically, their model is unrestrictive in terms of its institutional assumptions, but it imposes a highly implausible behavioral assumption that drives the key results. Empirically, their assessment of the performance of the zero intelligence model turns on a misunderstanding of the relevant data for testing coalition theories. We demonstrate that the predictions of the zero-intelligence model are no more accurate than random guesses, in stark contrast to the predictions of well-established approaches in traditional coalition research. We conclude that scholars would be ill advised to dismiss traditional approaches in favor of the approach advanced by Golder, Golder, and Siegel.

Keywords: government formation, coalitions, zero-intelligence model

Suggested Citation

Martin, Lanny W. and Vanberg, Georg, A Step in the Wrong Direction: An Appraisal of the Zero-Intelligence Model of Government Formation (October 16, 2013). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2341141 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2341141

Lanny W. Martin (Contact Author)

Rice University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Houston, TX 77005-1892
United States

Georg Vanberg

Duke University - Department of Political Science ( email )

140 Science Drive (Gross Hall), 2nd floor
Duke University Mailcode: 90204
Durham, NC 27708-0204
United States

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