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'Guns for Hire, Death on Demand': The Permissibility of U.S. Outsourcing of Drone Attacks to Civilian Surrogates of the Armed Forces and Challenges to Traditional Just War Theory

60 Pages Posted: 20 Oct 2013 Last revised: 3 Jul 2014

Kevin H. Govern

Ave Maria School of Law; California University of Pennsylvania; John Jay College

Scott A Schlager

University of Pennsylvania; Suffolk University Law School

Date Written: 2013

Abstract

Assassinations and licit targeted killings - distinctions with a difference?

Guns for hire: the history of private military firms and private military corporations as distinct entities and not just mercenaries by another name.

Authority and liability of civilian operatives under just war theory, international law, and domestic law.

Keywords: Asssassination, Targeted Killing, Private Military Firms, PMFs, Private Military Corporations, PMCs, Mercenaries, Operator, Operative, Military, Central Intelligence Agency, CIA, Just War, International Law, Domestic Law

JEL Classification: H56

Suggested Citation

Govern, Kevin H. and Schlager, Scott A, 'Guns for Hire, Death on Demand': The Permissibility of U.S. Outsourcing of Drone Attacks to Civilian Surrogates of the Armed Forces and Challenges to Traditional Just War Theory (2013). Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. XXV, No. 2, 2013. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2341756

Kevin H. Govern (Contact Author)

Ave Maria School of Law ( email )

1025 Commons Circle
Naples, FL 34119
United States
(239) 687-5390 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.avemarialaw.edu/faculty/kevin-h-govern/

California University of Pennsylvania ( email )

250 University Avenue
California, PA 15062
United States
(845) 234-8532 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.calu.edu/academics/faculty/Kevin-Govern.aspx

John Jay College ( email )

524 West 59th Street
New York, NY 10019
United States
(845) 234-8532 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.jjay.cuny.edu/faculty/kevin-govern

Scott A Schlager

University of Pennsylvania ( email )

Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Suffolk University Law School ( email )

120 Tremont Street
Boston, MA 02108-4977
United States

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