Antidumping and the Death of Trade

37 Pages Posted: 18 Oct 2013 Last revised: 8 Jun 2022

See all articles by Tibor Besedes

Tibor Besedes

Georgia Institute of Technology

Thomas J. Prusa

Rutgers University

Date Written: October 2013

Abstract

We investigate the extent to which antidumping actions eliminate trade altogether. Using quarterly export data for products involved in U.S. antidumping cases we find that antidumping actions increase the hazard rate by more than fifty percent. We find strong evidence of investigation effects with the impact during the initiation and preliminary duty phases considerably larger than during the final duty phase. There are also important differences with respect to the size of duties. Cases with higher duties face a much higher hazard in the preliminary phase but there is little additional effect when the final duty is actually levied. By contrast, cases with lower duties have a smaller but more persistent effect on the hazard, which proves to be highly detrimental in the long run as many trade relationship cease during the duration of the order. Given the literature on heterogeneous firms and trade, our results imply antidumping protection imposes greater costs than previously recognized.

Suggested Citation

Besedes, Tibor and Prusa, Thomas J., Antidumping and the Death of Trade (October 2013). NBER Working Paper No. w19555, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2342052

Tibor Besedes (Contact Author)

Georgia Institute of Technology ( email )

221 Bobby Dodd Way
Atlanta, GA 30332-0615
United States

Thomas J. Prusa

Rutgers University ( email )

Dept of Economics
75 Hamilton St
New Brunswick, NJ 08901
United States
848-932-8646 (Phone)
732-932-7416 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
24
Abstract Views
371
PlumX Metrics