Diverse Behavior Patterns in a Symmetric Society with Voluntary Partnerships

47 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2013 Last revised: 29 Jun 2016

See all articles by Takako Fujiwara-Greve

Takako Fujiwara-Greve

Keio University - Faculty of Economics

Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara

University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 29, 2016

Abstract

We show that it is evolutionarily stable that some players behave cooperatively while others act myopically, after any length of "trust-building" phase, where the partners do not cooperate but keep the partnership, in the Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma (Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara, 2009). Each player is playing a pure strategy in a large homogeneous population. Hence diverse behavior patterns are stable. The logic is that "diverse mutants support diversity": when mutant strategies are spread over a large variety, the mutants exploit each other and the incumbent distribution is robust. Since there are infinite strategies, such uncoordinated mutation is plausible.

Keywords: Diversity, evolution, voluntary partnerships, repeated Prisoner's Dilemma

JEL Classification: C73

Suggested Citation

Fujiwara-Greve, Takako and Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro, Diverse Behavior Patterns in a Symmetric Society with Voluntary Partnerships (June 29, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2343119 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2343119

Takako Fujiwara-Greve (Contact Author)

Keio University - Faculty of Economics ( email )

2-15-45 Mita, Ninato-ku
Tokyo 1088345
Japan

Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara

University of Tokyo - Faculty of Economics ( email )

7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku
Tokyo 113-0033
Japan

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