The (Non-)Robustness of Influential Cheap Talk Equilibria

15 Pages Posted: 23 Oct 2013

See all articles by Christoph Diehl

Christoph Diehl

Bielefeld University

Christoph Kuzmics

University of Graz - Department of Economics

Date Written: October 21, 2013

Abstract

Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) prove the existence of influential cheap talk equilibria in one sender one receiver games when the state is multidimensional and the preferences of the sender are state-independent. We show that only the babbling equilibrium survives the introduction of any small degree of uncertainty about the sender’s preferences in the spirit of Harsanyi (1973). None of the influential equilibria are robust to this kind of uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

Diehl, Christoph and Kuzmics, Christoph, The (Non-)Robustness of Influential Cheap Talk Equilibria (October 21, 2013). Institute of Mathematical Economics Working Paper No. 489. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2343360 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2343360

Christoph Diehl (Contact Author)

Bielefeld University ( email )

Universitätsstraße 25
Bielefeld, 33615
Germany

Christoph Kuzmics

University of Graz - Department of Economics ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15
RESOWI - F4
Graz, 8010
Austria

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