CEO Turnover and Volatility under Long-Term Employment Contracts
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2020, 55(6): 1757-1791
92 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2013 Last revised: 19 Oct 2020
Date Written: February 26, 2019
Abstract
We study the role of the contractual time horizon of CEOs for CEO turnover and corporate policies. Using hand-collected data on 3,954 fixed-term CEO contracts, we show that remaining time under contract predicts CEO turnover. When contracts are close to expiration, turnover is more likely and is more sensitive to performance. We also show a positive within-CEO relation between remaining time under contract and firm risk. Our results are similar across short and long contracts and are driven neither by firm or CEO survival, nor technological cycles. They are consistent with incentives to take long-term projects with interim volatility.
Keywords: Risk taking, volatility, career concerns, CEO contracts, CEO turnover
JEL Classification: G34, J41, J63
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
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