CEO Turnover and Volatility under Long-Term Employment Contracts

92 Pages Posted: 22 Oct 2013 Last revised: 28 Feb 2019

See all articles by Peter Cziraki

Peter Cziraki

University of Toronto - Department of Economics; Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

Moqi Groen-Xu

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE)

Date Written: February 26, 2019

Abstract

We study the role of the contractual time horizon of CEOs for CEO turnover and corporate policies. Using hand-collected data on 3,954 fixed-term CEO contracts, we show that remaining time under contract predicts CEO turnover. When contracts are close to expiration, turnover is more likely and is more sensitive to performance. We also show a positive within-CEO relation between remaining time under contract and firm risk. Our results are similar across short and long contracts and are driven neither by firm or CEO survival, nor technological cycles. They are consistent with incentives to take long-term projects with interim volatility.

Keywords: Risk taking, volatility, career concerns, CEO contracts, CEO turnover

JEL Classification: G34, J41, J63

Suggested Citation

Cziraki, Peter and Groen-Xu, Moqi, CEO Turnover and Volatility under Long-Term Employment Contracts (February 26, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2343541 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2343541

Peter Cziraki (Contact Author)

University of Toronto - Department of Economics ( email )

150 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S3G7
Canada
+1 416 946 3298 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/petercziraki

Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC) ( email )

Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Moqi Groen-Xu

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) ( email )

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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