Strategic Information Exchange

49 Pages Posted: 25 Oct 2013 Last revised: 6 Nov 2013

See all articles by Dinah Rosenberg

Dinah Rosenberg

HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences

Eilon Solan

Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences

Nicolas Vieille

HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences

Date Written: October 24, 2013

Abstract

We analyze a toy class of two-player repeated games with two-sided incomplete information. In effect, two players are facing independent decision problems and each of them holds information that is potentially valuable to the other player. We study to what extent, and how, information can be exchanged at equilibrium. We show that, provided one’s initial information is valuable to the other player, equilibria exist at which an arbitrary amount of information is exchanged at an arbitrary high rate. The construction relies on an indefinite, reciprocated, exchange.

Suggested Citation

Rosenberg, Dinah and Solan, Eilon and Vieille, Nicolas, Strategic Information Exchange (October 24, 2013). Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 82, No. November, 2013; HEC Paris Research Paper No. ECO/SCD-2013-1009. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2344666

Dinah Rosenberg

HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences ( email )

Paris
France

Eilon Solan

Tel Aviv University - School of Mathematical Sciences ( email )

Tel Aviv 69978
Israel

Nicolas Vieille (Contact Author)

HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences ( email )

Paris
France

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